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How Africans Shaped British Colonial 
Institutions: Evidence from Local Taxation
Jutta Bolt and leigh gardner
The institutions that governed most of the rural population in British colonial 
Africa have been neglected in the literature on colonialism. We use new data 
on local governments, or “Native Authorities,” to present the first quantitative 
comparison of African institutions under indirect rule in four colonies in 1948: 
Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Nyasaland, and Kenya. Tax data show that Native 
Authorities’ capacity varied within and between colonies, due to both underlying 
economic inequalities and African elites’ relations with the colonial government. 
Our findings suggest that Africans had a bigger hand in shaping British colonial 
institutions than often acknowledged.
In 1980, historian and former colonial officer Anthony Kirk-Greene drew attention to the small number of European officers in British colo-
nial governments in Africa. He called this the “thin white line” (Kirk-
Greene 1980, pp. 38–41). Nevertheless, he did not consider the colonial 
administration in danger of collapse, since large numbers of Africans had 
roles in it, particularly in governing the rural interior.
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His observation is a salutary caution to writers on colonial institutions 
in Africa. Too much of the recent work on the legacies of colonial rule has 
focused on what happened in colonial capitals rather than in rural areas, 
and on the nature of national rather than local institutions (Bertocchi and 
Canova 2002; Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau 2006; La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Easterly 
and Levine 2016). This work has been criticized for taking a Eurocentric 
approach to understanding colonial institutions, treating colonies as an 
institutional “blank slate,” which European colonizers could govern 
without reference to indigenous institutions (Bayly 2008). 
Others, however, have argued that indigenous and precolonial insti-
tutions continued to be more important than national institutions in 
shaping African development through the colonial period and beyond 
(Gennaioli and Rainer 2007; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013, 
2014; Bandyopadhyay and Green 2016). To support this argument, these 
papers correlate anthropological measures of African state centralization 
from the Murdock Atlas (Murdock 1967), interpreted as a measure of 
“pre-colonial” state capacity, with later economic and political outcomes. 
However, such correlations say little about how interactions with colonial 
governments may have influenced African institutions during the colo-
nial period. Archibong (2018, 2019) is an exception, paying welcome 
attention to the relationship between African institutions and the colonial 
state in Nigeria. 
There is a rich qualitative literature on the ways in which Africans and 
African institutions responded to the evolving incentives of the colonial 
period (e.g. Mamdani 1996; Spear 2003). This work shows that African 
local governments, known at the time as “Native Authorities,” did not 
just preserve past institutions. Rather, the integration of African rulers 
into colonial administrations altered their sources of legitimacy and 
accountability, and both Africans and Europeans reinterpreted indigenous 
political traditions to suit changing circumstances. To date, however, the 
evidence used in these discussions has been largely anecdotal. 
This paper presents new data on the structure and capacity of Native 
Authorities for four British colonies, Nigeria, the Gold Coast (now 
Ghana), Nyasaland (now Malawi), and Kenya, and uses these data to 
argue that the interaction of colonial officials and African elites during 
the colonial period created substantial variation in colonial institutions 
both within and between colonies. The data are based on a set of district-
level surveys commissioned in 1948 for Lord Hailey’s five-volume report 
entitled Native Administration in the British African Territories (Hailey 
1951). The surveys were completed by district officers and are now held 
How Africans Shaped British Colonial Institutions 3
by the British National Archives.1 They asked a standard set of questions 
about the physical, economic, and demographic characteristics of each 
Native Authority area (of which there were often several in a district) and 
about the structure of the Native Authority, its finances, and its activities. 
They provide a rare quantitative and comparative account of these insti-
tutions both within and between British colonies in Africa.
These four colonies had a range of different types of colonial econo-
mies and political structures. In 1950, Britain had 15 colonies in Africa, 
including some of the smallest in the region and some of the largest (see 
Figure 1). Their wide range of colonial histories makes it difficult to iden-
tify representative cases. One reason for choosing these four is that they 
contained just over half of the African population under British rule in 
1950 (52.7 percent, using population estimates from Frankema and Jerven 
(2014)). Using the widely cited typology developed by Samir Amin 
(1973), our selection includes colonies dominated by peasant production 
(Nigeria and the Gold Coast) and colonies with European settlers and 
large-scale expatriate production (Kenya and Nyasaland). The Gold Coast 
was one of British Africa’s export success stories, while Nyasaland was 
one of Britain’s poorest colonies. All four incorporated different types of 
indigenous institutions, from hierarchical states to decentralized village-
based societies. Due to these differences, they provide good empirical 
evidence to support our argument that interactions between Africans and 
Europeans created a landscape of colonial institutions that varied enor-
mously both within and between different colonies.
We use tax revenue from c. 1948 as a measure of the capacity of Native 
Authorities.2 The structure of tax systems and the amount of revenue 
they produce have become important for comparing and measuring state 
capacity in different historical periods and contexts (Dincecco 2011; 
Karaman and Pamuk 2013). This approach has been used in compara-
tive studies of colonial states in Africa to examine the capacity of central 
governments (e.g., Mkandawire 2010; Frankema and van Waijenburg 
2014). But this work has largely ignored local governments, thus 
neglecting a significant component of colonial fiscal systems.3 By the 
end of the colonial period, local government spending as a share of 
total government spending was over 20 percent in highly decentralized 
1 U.K. National Archives CO 1018, various files. The specific files used here are as follows: 
Gold Coast, CO 1018/10, CO 1018/11, CO 1018/15; Kenya, CO 1018/22, CO 1018/23, CO 
1018/24, CO 1018/25, CO 1018/25, CO 1018/27; Nyasaland, CO 1018/58, CO 1018/59, CO 
1018/60; Nigeria, CO 1018/36, CO 1018/38, CO 1018/39, CO 1018/40. 
2 Dates may vary by a year or two depending on data availability. See Online Appendix 1 for 
detailed definitions of variables and country-specific lists of sources. 
3 Hoffman (2015, p. 308). For a partial exception, see Gardner (2012).
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colonies, such as Nigeria and Uganda, and between 5 and 10 percent in 
most others.4 Even where the overall share was small, this local spending 
was nevertheless important from the perspective of the African popula-
tion. The biggest items in national colonial governments’ budgets tended 
to be salaries for urban European officials or funds for building railways 
(Frankema 2011). However, most of the population was rural—in the 
four colonies studied here, between 60 and 85 percent of the labor force 
was employed in agriculture in the 1960s (Broadberry and Gardner 2016, 
Figure 1
BRITISH COLONIAL AFRICA WITH SELECTED CASES
Source: Based on Reid (2009, p. 201). The map does not include divided territories such as 
Somaliland, Togo, or the Cameroons. 
4 To put this in today’s context, a 2008 study of decentralization levels in 20 Sub-Saharan Africa 
countries found that an average of 14 percent of total government expenditure was incurred by 
subnational units (Dziobek et al. 2011, p. 23). 
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p. 26). For this part of the population, it was the Native Authorities who 
provided many government services, including a system of courts, local 
regulation of land and markets, and some local education and health care. 
The scale and quality of these services depended on how much revenue 
Native Authorities could collect. 
We show that the substantial variation in tax revenue collected by 
Native Authorities reflects not only regional economic inequalities but 
also differences in the institutions that developed during the colonial 
period as a result of the different ways in which African institutions were 
integrated into the machinery of British colonial rule. This suggests that 
we need a new approach to the study of British colonial institutions in 
Africa, one that treats them neither as purely European inventions nor as 
simply the continuation of pre-colonial systems, but rather, as we argue 
here, as the outcome of interactions between Africans and Europeans. 
In this paper, we take a first step toward quantifying the structure and 
capacity of local institutions created through these interactions. 
A SHORT HISTORY OF INDIRECT RULE IN BRITISH AFRICA
Sub-Saharan Africa was one of the last regions to be colonized by 
European powers. By that stage, they were not prepared to invest large 
sums in establishing an administrative apparatus in the colonies, which 
meant that colonial governments had to support recurrent expenditure 
with limited local revenue collections (Gardner 2012) and, thus, had to 
leave many of the main tasks of governing in the hands of Africans (Iliffe 
2007, p. 193). The African local governments or “Native Authorities” 
established in the decades before 1914 were, thus, the vital link between 
the majority of the African population and the skeletal European admin-
istrations. One report from Nyasaland (1937, Appendix 1) described the 
Native Authority as “the executive government in all matters pertaining 
to natives.” 
However, the process by which Native Authorities were established, 
and the degree of power that colonial governments delegated to them, 
differed both within and between colonies. While it is common for “indi-
rect rule” to be contrasted with “direct rule,” these were not distinct types. 
Relationships between indigenous institutions and colonial administra-
tions varied, resulting in different degrees of shared authority (Gerring 
et al. 2011, pp. 382–83; Naseemullah and Staniland 2016, p. 13). Lord 
Hailey (1942, p. 13) deliberately avoided using the phrase indirect rule, 
saying it had “no claim to precision.” As a system of governance, indi-
rect rule was only vaguely defined and implemented differently across 
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colonial Africa (Dudley 1968, pp. 13–14). In his study of southeastern 
Nigeria, for example, Afigbo (1972, p. 3) argues that excessive emphasis 
on the system developed in northern Nigeria, “described erroneously as 
the classical pattern,” has distorted our understanding of the variety of 
practices found across British Africa. 
European colonizers encountered a wide range of indigenous insti-
tutions in Africa (Osadolor and Otoide 2005, p. 159; Osafo-Kwaako 
and Robinson 2013). They could be complex, hierarchical, and highly 
centralized, as in kingdoms such as Asante, Buganda, and the emirates 
of northern Nigeria, or horizontally oriented based on villages or clans in 
which decisions were made collectively by representatives of lineages or 
age sets. The latter included the Igbo in Nigeria or the Maasai and Luo 
in Kenya (Hawthorne 2013, pp. 78–79). In their classic work on African 
political systems, anthropologists Meyer Fortes and Edward Evans-
Pritchard (1966, p. 5) divide them into Group A, “societies which have 
centralized authority, administrative machinery and judicial institutions,” 
and Group B, segmentary societies, which lack those features and “in 
which there are no sharp divisions of rank, status or wealth.” 
African institutions experienced considerable upheaval throughout the 
nineteenth century, linked to both external and internal shifts (Boahen 
1989; Ogbomo 2005; Iliffe 2007, pp. 164–92). The peak of the Atlantic 
slave trade in the eighteenth century, followed by its end in the nine-
teenth, the Fulani jihads, and the Zulu Mfecane all caused disruptions of 
various types across wide swathes of the region. During this period, some 
older states, such as the Oyo Empire in what became Nigeria, declined, 
while others, such as Ibadan in Nigeria or Asante in what became the 
Gold Coast, expanded their power at the expense of those that had begun 
to fade. 
Colonial conquest brought its own disruptions above and beyond the 
considerable violence of colonial wars (Falola 2009; Huillery 2011). 
Colonial governments hoped that they could minimize disruption by 
incorporating existing institutions into the colonial administration (Berry 
1992, p. 329). The way they did this in each colony depended on how they 
perceived African institutions and how Africans responded to their inter-
ventions. In northern Nigeria, where states were already highly central-
ized and most of the Fulani aristocracy were willing to cooperate with the 
British in exchange for political support, Lord Lugard merely placed the 
British colonial government at the top of an existing hierarchical system. 
In such cases, the emirs often enjoyed increased internal authority even 
while ceding external power (Paden 1970, p. 163). However, where states 
resisted British rule, as in the case of Asante, the British government 
How Africans Shaped British Colonial Institutions 7
often took steps to strengthen rivals by allocating territorial and political 
authority (Berry 1992, p. 332). In Nigeria, when Ibadan proved less than 
cooperative, British officials attempted to revive the old supremacy of 
Oyo (Atanda 1970, pp. 215–16). 
In regions with less identifiably centralized institutions, the creation of 
Native Authorities was more likely to involve the appointment of chiefs 
by European district officers than the identification of those with existing 
legitimacy. In the northern Gold Coast, for example, those chiefs who 
“appeared to have the necessary authority … were recognized as agen-
cies” for the maintenance of law and order, but “in other cases chief-
doms were created by the appointment of persons who seemed to possess 
local prestige or authority” (Hailey 1951, p. 262). Kenya’s 1902 Village 
Headmen Ordinance, which made village headmen responsible for law 
and order in their villages, called for the appointment of said headmen 
by European officials and gave them little power (Hailey 1951, p. 92). 
Similarly, in Nyasaland, the 1912 District Administration (Native) 
Ordinance mandated the appointment of village headmen and principal 
headmen. It did not exclude “the use of traditional Native Authorities as 
agencies of local rule” but intended the headmen to act “mainly as execu-
tive agents of the Administration” (Hailey 1951, pp. 25–26). In south-
eastern Nigeria, such appointees were described derisively as “warrant 
chiefs,” whose only authority came from their link to the British colonial 
administration (Afigbo 1972). 
By 1914, when the initial construction of colonial administrations in 
Africa was largely complete, Native Authorities included everything 
from appointed village heads to powerful emirs who had signed trea-
ties with the British government. Colonial authorities referred to all of 
these figures as “chiefs” and, at this point, chiefs alone constituted Native 
Authorities, which formed the “executive government” by which British 
colonial administrations governed the vast majority of their African 
territory. 
During the interwar period, colonial governments across British 
Africa attempted to reform and expand this system, granting to Native 
Authorities new powers of taxation and new responsibilities for the provi-
sion of government services. In some Native Authorities, councils were 
established to expand political access to groups outside traditional hierar-
chies, including migrants and those educated in mission schools. In these, 
the Native Authority was no longer just the chief but rather the chief in 
council. Many histories of colonial governance in British Africa explain 
this as an effort to channel the growing political activism of Africans 
toward local rather than national governance (see, e.g., Lonsdale 1968). 
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Decentralization also gave colonial governments a means of responding 
to demand for increased provision of education and other services without 
overburdening central government budgets (Gardner 2012, pp. 161–91).
Contemporaries described reforms to the Native Authority system 
as an effort to transform African institutions into a more bureaucratic 
system of local government (Hicks 1961, p. 8). Perhaps the most impor-
tant of these changes was the establishment of Native Treasuries and 
the granting of powers to levy taxes (known as local rates). In Nigeria, 
Native Treasuries were established in 1917 with the passing of the Native 
Revenue Ordinance. In the other three colonies in our sample, trea-
suries were not introduced until the 1930s.5 The establishment of Native 
Treasuries and increase in Native Authority revenue led to an increase in 
fiscal decentralization in British Africa, even in colonies that had been 
highly centralized in previous decades. This is shown in Figure 2, with 
decentralization measured as local government’s share of total govern-
ment spending. 
Along with powers to tax came new powers and responsibilities for 
service provision. In Kenya, for example, the 1937 Native Authority 
Ordinance gave Local Native Councils control over a range of local 
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Figure 2
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
Sources: National expenditure figures from Blue Books before 1945 and Financial Reports 
thereafter. Data on local government finances from Gold Coast (1952); Kenya (1948, 1949); 
Nigeria, Native Treasury Estimates 1947–9, in U.K. National Archives CO 1019/41; Nyasaland, 
“Economic Statistics,” in U.K. National Archives CO 1015/422; and Nyasaland (various, 1937). 
5 The relevant laws were as follows: 1933 Native Authority Ordinance (Nyasaland), 1937 Native 
Authority Ordinance (Kenya), and Ordinance No. 25 of 1936 and the 1939 Native Administration 
Treasuries Ordinance (Gold Coast). 
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government policies, from the control of water supplies to the regulation 
of grazing and the cutting of timber (Hailey 1951, p. 93). Service provi-
sion included the operation of schools and clinics. The extent of these 
services depended on the Native Authorities’ budgets. For example, 
the budget of the North Kavirondo Local Native Council in Kenya, as 
submitted to Lord Hailey, shows that in 1947 the LNC spent approxi-
mately 30 percent of its budget on education, 29 percent on agricultural 
services, and 9 percent on public health and social welfare. Just 9 percent 
was spent on administration—principally the salaries of chiefs and their 
councilors. By contrast, the Mlange Native Authority in Nyasaland spent 
47 percent of its budget on administration, and the District Commissioner 
wrote in his survey response that this did not “leave much” for other 
priorities. 
The availability of resources was directly related to the decentraliza-
tion of service responsibilities to Native Authorities. The 1937 Nyasaland 
memorandum cited earlier stated that responsibilities for the extension of 
services by Native Authorities would not be approved until the budget 
contained “full provision for the transferred or extended service” and the 
Native Authority could support both capital expenditure and recurrent 
expenditure. This had political as well as financial motives. “Unless the 
Native Authority actually pays,” the memorandum argued, “it will be 
difficult to make the Native Authority and people believe that the trans-
ferred service is actually transferred.” In other words, the ability of the 
Native Authority to act without interference from the colonial govern-
ment depended on the amount of revenue it could raise. 
The Native Authorities varied widely in their ability to cope with these 
new responsibilities (Hinden 1950, p. 32). A 1948 report by the colonial 
administration of Kenya observed that “a distressing feature, accentuated 
during the war, is the lack of uniformity in the rate of progress between 
the semi-sophisticated and the backward tribes in the colony. The inhab-
itants of Nyanza and Kikuyu areas of Central Province might be living 
in a different world from the Masai and Elgeyo, for example” (Kenya 
1948).
NATIVE AUTHORITIES
Before the 1940s, information on Native Authority administrations 
and their finances is fragmentary, often presented only in aggregate form 
at the district or provincial level and recorded only in internal administra-
tive reports and not in annual reports of statistics sent to the metropolitan 
government in London. Inadequate data may be one reason why local 
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governments have been neglected in studies of colonial taxation, which 
rely heavily on these reports. However, policies of decentralization from 
the 1930s drew the imperial government’s attention to the diversity of 
institutions and practices, prompting a demand for more systematic 
comparisons of Native Authorities. The eventual response to this demand 
provided the data that have enabled us to produce the first quantitative 
account of Native Authority institutions, making it possible to compare 
them within and between colonies.
A central figure in the British government’s efforts to bring clarity to 
this subject was Lord Hailey, a retired Indian civil service officer who 
wrote a number of reports on colonial administration in Africa, begin-
ning with his mammoth African Survey, published in 1938 (Hailey 1938; 
Cell 1989). The Survey has a chapter on Native Administration, which 
Hailey extended in 1942 with a brief study that was available at first 
only to government officials and a few selected scholars. In 1947, the 
Colonial Office asked him to bring this work up to date and the result was 
the report published in five volumes from 1951. To compile the report, 
Hailey sent questionnaires to district officers in ten British colonies in 
Africa (the Gambia, the Gold Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia, 
Nyasaland, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika, Uganda, and Zanzibar), asking 
about the physical, economic, demographic, and institutional charac-
teristics of each Native Authority area.6 The responses varied in their 
level of detail, with some providing long narrative accounts of the opera-
tions of local institutions and others restricting themselves to very short 
answers. Where necessary, we supplemented these data with data from 
other government reports from our four colonies. 
Table 1 shows the area and populations of Native Treasury areas in the 
four colonies. Immediately noticeable is the wide variation in physical 
size and population. In Nigeria, for example, the smallest Native Treasury 
had just over 3,000 people while the largest had close to three million. The 
variation was less extreme in the other three colonies, but still substantial. 
Michael Crowder and Obaro Ikime (1970, p. xiii) noted in their study 
of chiefs in West Africa that British preoccupations with the pre-colo-
nial “legitimacy” of Native Authorities resulted in Native Authorities 
of many shapes and sizes. Attempts to combine them for administrative 
convenience often met with African opposition. In the Gold Coast, for 
example, the Kassena, Nankanni, and Builsa resisted colonial efforts to 
unite them under one Native Authority (Ladouceur 1979, p. 55). 
6 The questionnaire was the same for all colonies, apart from a few differences reflecting local 
conditions. For example, the questionnaires for Kenya and Nyasaland asked about the presence 
of European settlement and alienated land, which was unnecessary in the West African colonies. 
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The political structures governing the colonial populations were far 
from uniform. For a start, chiefs could be chosen by “traditional selection” 
(hereditary, or from a small number of “chiefly” families, along patri-
lineal or matrilineal lines), elected by the local population, or appointed 
by the district officer. Traditional selection did not always mean that 
succession practices had been inherited from the pre-colonial period; 
in parts of Nyasaland, for example, chieftaincies initially occupied by 
government appointees became hereditary over time. Hailey’s surveys 
asked whether chiefs could be removed, either by their constituents or 
the district officer. In some regions, removal of a chief by the people, 
known as “de-stooling,” was common: in the Gold Coast, two thirds of 
the Native Authorities had experienced it. In other regions, chiefs effec-
tively held the post for life: in Kenya, none of the surveys recorded the 
removal of Native Authorities.
The other two ingredients of the “mature” Native Authority system, 
as identified by Hicks (1961), were treasuries and courts. A Native 
Authority could have its own treasury, but often many smaller Native 
Authorities federated for financial purposes. In Nigeria, about half of the 
Native Authorities had done this, and in the Gold Coast, 10 of the 126. 
In Kenya, in contrast, all the Native Authorities had federated, and in 
Nyasaland, all but one.
Native Authorities had varying degrees of responsibility for managing 
their own assets. Those with literate members and some degree of fiscal 
knowledge set their own estimates; those without depended on the 
taBle 1
AREA AND POPULATIONS OF NATIVE TREASURY AREAS C. 1948
 Population
 Number of Native  
Authorities Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Gold Coast 91 37,685 56,920 1,587 378,586
Nyasaland 17 140,708 82,828 15,593 323,923
Kenya 27 168,470 170,876 15,341 633,568
Nigeria 226 153,796 312,249 3,273 2,882,414 
Area (km2)
 Number of Native  
Authorities Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Gold Coast 91 2,639 5,020 11 36,307
Nyasaland 17 5,663 3,292 310 14,681
Kenya 27 15,523 18,556 279 78,770
Nigeria 226 6,325 10,985 68 84,826
Sources: Gold Coast (1948), Kenya (1949), Nigeria (1955), and Nyasaland economic statistics in 
U.K. National Archives CO 1015/522. 
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district officer to set them. Native Courts were responsible for hearing 
local cases, both civil and criminal, but their power to hear appeals 
or impose particular types of punishment varied. Table 2 summarizes 
measures of institutional differences for our four colonies, coded from 
the Hailey surveys. As mentioned above, the comprehensiveness of the 
survey responses varied. The table shows the full sample of observations 
and a subsample, which we use in the regression analysis below to make 
it easier to interpret changes in coefficient estimates.
The full sample consists of 361 Native Treasury areas in our four colo-
nies. The total number of observations for each institutional indicator 
varies between 279 and 294. The regression sample, for which we have 
information for all variables, has 189 observations (Bolt and Gardner 
2020). As Table 2 shows, the regression sample is very similar to the 
full sample in terms of the institutional characteristics of the Native 
Authorities.
The main measure of Native Authority capacity used in this paper 
is the per capita tax revenue collected by Native Authorities. Data on 
revenue per capita were available for 328 of the total 361 Native Treasury 
areas. As the fiscal data reported in the Hailey surveys vary in their 
level of detail, we supplemented them with data from other government 
reports. Table 3 presents the summary statistics of these data, for the 
full sample and the regression sample. The mean is the same in the two 
taBle 2
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES  
OF NATIVE AUTHORITIES, C. 1948
Variable
Full  
Samplea
Regression 
Samplea
Autonomy Traditional selection 69% 72%
NA sets own estimates 19% 18%
Presence of appeal court 56% 62%
Voice and Average no. of NAs per Treasury 6 5
 accountability NA can be removed by people 28% 31%
NA elected by people 24% 20%
Chief in council 54% 52%
Solo chief 21% 26%
Observations 279–294b 189
Notes: aShare of Native Authorities in the sample where the variable is present. bNumber of 
observations differs per variable. The summary statistics for individual countries are presented in 
Online Appendix 2. A t-test shows that the two samples do not differ significantly. 
Sources: Hailey surveys, U.K. National Archives CO 1018.
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samples, but the variation in the full sample is unsurprisingly larger as 
the maximum amount of revenue collected is much higher. However, 
the 272 pence per capita collected in Effiduasi Sub-Division in the 
Gold Coast is an outlier and is not included in the regression sample 
due to missing observations for variables other than revenue per capita. 
Removing it lowers the maximum amount of revenue collected in the 
full sample to 187 pence per capita, which reduces the standard devia-
tion to 30.5, much closer to the corresponding figure for the regression 
sample. 
Figure 3 maps these statistics onto the boundaries of the Native 
Treasury areas, digitized from archival maps.7 Our paper is the first to 
digitize these boundaries, allowing for spatial analysis of the nature and 
capacity of African institutions. Revenue per capita in all four maps is 
shown on the same scale, illustrating its considerable variation within 
and between colonies. In all four maps, white indicates “no data.” These 
were areas where we could not match the names on colonial maps to 
fiscal data or, in the case of Kenya in particular, to areas of European 
settlement where local governments were led by Europeans.
Johnson and Koyama (2017, p. 2) define state capacity as the “ability 
of a state to collect taxes, enforce law and order, and provide public 
goods.” Tax data have long been an important source of information 
in work on institutions and state building, both historically and today. 
There are two reasons for this. One is that taxation is linked to broader 
issues of state capacity, governments’ relationship to taxpayers, changing 
taBle 3
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF REVENUE PER CAPITA, C. 1948
 Number 
of Native 
Authorities Mean
Std.  
Dev. Min. Max. 
Revenue per capita, pence (full sample) 328 39 33 0.21 272
Revenue per capita, pence (reg. sample) 189 39 28 3 138
Sources: Gold Coast (1952); Kenya (1949); Nigeria, Native Treasury Estimates 1947–9, in UK 
National Archives CO 1019/41; Nyasaland, “Economic Statistics,” in U.K. National Archives 
CO 1015/422; and Nyasaland (various). 
7 Maps were sourced from several archives: Gold Coast, “Native States,” 1946, British Library 
65356 (19); Kenya, Map of the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya Showing District Boundaries 
and Provinces (1936), U.K. National Archives CO 533/470/1; Nyasaland, “British Central Africa 
1906,” Royal Geographical Society mr Malawi G.11. The Nigeria map was compiled from 
regional and provincial maps: Eastern, Local Government, Royal Geographic Society mr Nigeria 
Div. 34; Western, Provincial Maps, Bodleian Library (Abeokuta E39:10(1), Benin E39:13(2), 
Ijebu E39:19(1), Ondo E39:26(1), Oyo E39:29(2), Warri E39.34(1)); Northern, Native Authority 
Areas, Bodleian Library E39:1(22). 
Bolt and Gardner14
Figure 3
NATIVE AUTHORITY REVENUE PER CAPITA (CURRENT PENCE)
Sources: Table 3. Sources of maps in footnote 7.
A. Gold Coast B. Nigeria
C. Kenya D. Nyasaland
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institutional structures, and economic development (Schumpeter 1954; 
Levi 1988; Tilly 1990). Today, there is a strong correlation between tax 
revenues and per capita income, though the direction of the relationship 
is not always clear (Dincecco 2011, pp. 2–3). The second reason is that 
tax data are both widely available and easily comparable (Lieberman 
2002, pp. 89–90). In this literature, different types of tax revenue are 
often interpreted as measuring different things. Some types of revenue, 
such as that from income or other direct taxes, may be a better indicator 
of state capacity than others, such as that from trade or resource taxes. 
The relative shares of direct and indirect tax revenue are often used as 
an indicator of state capacity (Mkandawire 2010; Frankema and van 
Waijenburg 2014).8 
Unlike central colonial governments, Native Authorities did not 
collect trade taxes. Their revenue sources can be broken down into three 
categories: direct taxes imposed by the Native Authorities themselves, 
referred to as “local rates”; rebates on direct taxes imposed by the colo-
nial government; and fines or license fees of various kinds. The third 
category includes fees paid for market licenses, court fines, and some-
times royalties for natural resources. These tended to be a relatively 
small share of total revenue, meaning the biggest source was direct 
taxes. In Nigeria and Nyasaland, Native Authorities were responsible for 
collecting tax revenue for the central government and received a share 
of that revenue, which varied over time and, sometimes, between Native 
Authorities. There was no revenue sharing between the central govern-
ment and Native Authorities in Kenya and the Gold Coast. 
Some examples will make the picture clear. Gonja in the northern 
Gold Coast received approximately £5,400 from local rates, £400 from 
cattle tax, £400 from market fees, £400 from fishing licenses, £600 from 
the rental of kraals, and £210 from Native Authority ferries. Zaria in 
northern Nigeria collected £74,000 in general tax (exclusive of payments 
to the central government), £10,000 in jangali or cattle tax, £5,000 in 
fees from Native Courts, and £1,000 from interest on investments. In 
much of northern Nigeria, the taxes collected by Native Administrations 
built on elaborate systems of pre-colonial taxation, which included zakat, 
a Muslim charitable tax, as well as jangali and other agricultural taxes 
(Okauru 2012, pp. 69–71). 
One source of revenue that cannot be documented in any systematic 
way was forced labor. As Marlous van Waijenburg (2018) has shown, 
8 De Roo (2017) argues that the need to establish control over trade routes to collect customs 
tariffs means revenue from this source can also act as an indicator of state capacity. 
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tax payments in the form of labor could represent an important source 
of implicit revenue for colonial states in French Africa, adding as much 
as 100 percent to total revenue in some cases. In British Africa, Native 
Authorities used forced labor to construct and maintain roads and other 
infrastructure (Roberts 2017). However, we have no data on the extent of 
this practice or its geographical variation. The absence of the necessary 
records reflects British government obfuscation of this matter at the time, 
in an attempt to claim formal compliance with international agreements, 
such as the 1926 Convention on Slavery, without disrupting existing 
practices (Miers 1998).
The incorporation of revenue from forced labor into the quantitative 
study of African fiscal systems is relatively new, and the relationship 
between revenue from forced labor and state capacity remains less clear 
than for cash revenue. On the one hand, van Waijenburg’s data show that 
labor taxes represented a larger share of total revenue during the early 
colonial period, when the capacity of colonial states was low. On the 
other, the mobilization of forced labor requires coercive capacity, and 
according to her data, the total amount of forced labor used in French 
Africa went up as state capacity in French colonies increased, even as 
cash revenue went up at a faster rate. It seems reasonable to speculate that 
if data were available on forced labor mobilized by Native Authorities, 
this would increase the variation in our sample rather than decrease 
it. 
In the following three sections, using data from the Hailey surveys and 
other sources, and drawing on theories about taxation and state capacity 
in Africa and elsewhere, we look at the relationship between Native 
Authority revenue and regional economic inequalities, intergovernmental 
relations, and the structure of the Native Authorities. The first section 
looks at market access and other proxies for higher agricultural incomes; 
the second at differences in Native Authority autonomy, drawing on local 
government finance literature that suggests a relationship between power 
sharing and local taxation; and the third at how the per capita revenue 
varied with the institutional structure of the Native Authorities in 1948. 
In all three sections, our analysis is descriptive and does not claim to 
establish the direction of causation in any of the relationships shown. 
However, taken together, the three sections show that variations within 
and between colonies in the per capita revenue of Native Authorities did 
not merely reflect differences in market access or the traditional structure 
of African institutions; they also reflected differences in the institutions’ 
structure that grew out of differences in the way indirect rule was imple-
mented across British colonial Africa.
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REGIONAL ECONOMIC INEQUALITIES AND NATIVE  
AUTHORITY REVENUE
One difficulty in using tax revenue as an indicator of state capacity is 
that factors other than state capacity can influence levels of tax revenue, 
in particular overall income levels and the structure of the economy 
(Teera and Hudson 2004, p. 786; Karaman and Pamuk 2013, p. 607). 
This section investigates the relationship of Native Authority tax revenue 
to underlying socioeconomic conditions. In their study of Uganda, 
Bandyopadhyay and Green (2016, p. 499) argue that the relationship 
they find between pre-colonial state centralization and contemporary 
development outcomes was the result of local economic inequalities that 
have persisted since the pre-colonial period. Therefore, it may be that the 
variations in tax revenue described in the previous section merely reflect 
similar underlying inequality. In many African countries today, spatial 
inequality remains comparatively high and explains a substantial share of 
overall inequality levels (Mveyange 2015; Lessmann and Seidel 2017). 
In this analysis, our dependent variable is revenue per capita. Adjusting 
the revenue data for population takes into account the variation in the 
sizes of Native Authority jurisdictions. Unfortunately, no direct measures 
of per capita income are available for this period at this level of spatial 
disaggregation.9 Wages and prices for Anglophone Africa during the colo-
nial period are presented as national averages and most likely reflect the 
situation in and around colonial capitals (Frankema and van Waijenburg 
2012).10 However, data are available on various proxies for the level of 
taxable surplus and the availability of “tax handles,” or structural features 
of economies that facilitate taxation (Musgrave 1969; Chelliah 1971; 
Mkandawire 2010). 
Agricultural production that is only used for subsistence is difficult to 
measure and tax, as governments are seldom willing to tax their constitu-
ents’ staple foods (Teera and Hudson 2004, p. 789). Crops produced for 
the market provide easier opportunities for the collection of tax revenue, 
and our analysis includes a dummy variable for whether cash crops, such 
as cocoa or cotton, were produced in each Native Authority area. During 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, African exports of such 
crops expanded dramatically (Frankema, Williamson, and Woltjer 2018), 
9 The scarcity of subnational (local) data remains a major hurdle in Africa even today. See 
African Development Bank (2015). 
10 Deflating revenue per capita by these wages does not eliminate the variation in revenue 
per capita. However, since the wage data do not reflect local price levels, revenue per capita is 
presented here in nominal terms. 
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raising the incomes of farmers both directly and indirectly. In Uganda, 
for example, peasant farmers produced modest amounts of cotton to 
supplement subsistence production, raising their incomes above unskilled 
market wages (de Haas 2017). In the Gold Coast, cocoa increased the 
incomes of those farmers who adopted it and also provided a larger 
domestic market for food producers through specialization in agricul-
tural labor (Aboagye and Bolt 2018). The expansion in the demand for 
food crops meant African farmers could now market their goods even in 
colonies where export crops were primarily produced by foreign-owned 
plantations or settler farms. 
The adoption of cash crops was uneven and dependent on the suitability 
of the soil and the access to markets (Tosh 1980). In largely agricultural 
economies, the potential productivity of the soil is taken as an indicator 
of possible per capita incomes (Ashraf and Galor 2011). Michalopoulos 
and Papaioannou (2013, pp. 124–25), for example, use a measure of the 
suitability of land for agriculture to control for pre-colonial incomes. 
Bandyopadhyay and Green (2016, p. 480) use the shallowness of the 
soils and clay content to account for geographical determinants of devel-
opment outcomes. In our study, we use the water-holding capacity of the 
soil as an indicator of soil quality.11 In Africa, with its low-technology 
rain-fed agriculture, availability of water is the main determinant of crop 
production (Leenaars, Claessens, Heuvelink, Hengl, Ruiperez Gonzalez, 
van Bussel, Guilpart, Yang, and Cassman. 2018, p. 1).
To capture market access, our analysis includes the number of railway 
stations per 1,000 inhabitants in each Native Authority area and the 
distance to the nearest major city.12 Railway networks in Africa were not 
extensive, but where they existed transport costs were considerably lower 
(Chaves, Engerman, and Robinson 2014; Herranz-Loncan and Fourie 
2018). They also shaped the economic geography of African countries to 
a large degree, promoting urbanization and the development of domestic 
markets (Jedwab and Moradi 2016; Jedwab, Kerby, and Moradi 2017; 
Buckwalter 2019). Cities were important centers of demand for agricul-
tural produce, both for local consumption and for export, as exports were 
often traded through capitals before being shipped overseas. Researchers 
often use distance to the coast as an indicator of access to export markets. 
11 Soil quality data from the Africa Soil Information Service, http://africasoils.net/services/
data/soil-databases/. 
12 Measured as the shortest distance from the geometric mean of each Native Authority area to 
the nearest big city, obtained from colonial censuses. Railway stations per Native Authority area 
were calculated using lists or maps of individual railway stations as follows: Gold Coast Railway 
(1948); East African Railways and Harbours (1951); Nyasaland map, Royal Geographic Society 
mr Malawi S/G.5; Nigeria (1948). 
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However, as exports were shipped from particular centers rather than 
from just anywhere on the coast, distance to major cities provides a more 
contextually relevant measure. 
This paper uses a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) model to illus-
trate the relationships between economic opportunity and revenue per 
capita. As noted above, the intention is to offer a descriptive analysis 
rather than identify channels of causation, and what is presented here 
are correlations in which causality could run in either direction. Table 4 
shows the results of this analysis.
The variables on cash crop production and market access are all strongly 
significant with the expected signs. Production of a cash crop has a coef-
ficient of between 10 and 11, as compared with a mean revenue per capita 
of 39 pence for the regression sample. The coefficient for railway stations 
per 1,000 people is similar in magnitude. Distance from large cities is 
consistently associated with lower revenue collection. 
The only variable that does not have the expected relationship with 
revenue per capita is soil quality. Following previous literature, the 
water-holding capacity of the soil should be positively related to revenue 
per capita. In our sample, it is actually negatively correlated with revenue 
per capita in all colonies except for Kenya, where the relationship is posi-
tive. However, in the regression sample, the correlation is consistently 
taBle 4
SUBNATIONAL ECONOMIC INEQUALITIES AND PER CAPITA REVENUE
 Revenue  
per Capita
Revenue  
per Capita
Revenue  
per Capita
Revenue  
per Capita
Cash crop dummy 11.04*** 10.07*** 11.36*** 11.31***
(3.26) (2.80) (3.23) (3.22)
Distance to large city –0.0384*** –0.0302** –0.0303**
(–3.09) (–2.45) (–2.46)
Railway stations 11.33** 11.29**
 per 1,000 population (2.54) (2.52)
Soil water capacity –0.124
(–0.23)
Constant 20.89*** 29.91*** 24.84*** 17.55*
(7.26) (6.99) (5.39) (1.69)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 189 189 189 189
R2 0.319 0.334 0.358 0.359
Notes: t-statistics adjusted for heteroscedasticity in parentheses. Significance levels: *p < 0.10, 
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Sources: Hailey surveys, U.K. National Archives CO 1018. Soil water capacity from Leenaars 
et al. (2018).
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insignificant. To check this result, we substituted various measures of soil 
quality, such as organic carbon stock, clay content, capacity to contain 
nutrients, Ph, bulk density, and a combination of all of these using factor 
analysis. None of the variables showed a strong and positive relationship 
with revenue per capita.
This lack of relationship is perhaps not as surprising as it seems. Soil 
mapping is not a precise science. In his contribution to the History of 
Cartography, Millea (2015, p. 1448) notes that maps attempting to capture 
the “general kind of soil that tends to form in a particular climate” often 
miss “the site-scale variability that occurs as a result of local geology, 
slope, internal drainage, vegetation cover and prior land use.” African soil 
maps, in particular, are often based on very limited and low-quality data 
(Showers 2005, pp. 215–16). Finally, the relationship between soil quality 
and tax revenue is potentially ambiguous. Fenske (2014) argues that 
African state building is linked to ecological diversity, which provided 
opportunities for specialization and trade, rather than to overall fertility. 
Native Authority revenue per capita is, thus, unsurprisingly related to 
differences in the opportunities available to African farmers for market 
production. As noted above, there is a potential for reverse causation in 
these relationships. Two of the significant variables considered in this 
section, railway stations per 1,000 and proximity to cities, are plausibly 
exogenous, since the location of both railways and urban centers was in 
most cases determined before the introduction of Native Authority trea-
suries. Other studies of the impact of colonial transport infrastructure 
have argued that, because the locations were determined by a mix of stra-
tegic, political, and economic factors, causal relationships can be estab-
lished (Jedwab and Moradi 2016; Bertazzini 2018). However, decisions 
by African farmers to introduce cash crops may have been partly related 
to the Native Authorities’ capacity to enforce land rights or provide other 
agricultural services. 
Differences in agricultural incomes are unlikely to be the whole story, 
as suggested by histories of fiscal development elsewhere. In his history 
of European fiscal development, Dincecco (2015, pp. 907–08) notes 
that tax receipts in England and France increased much faster than per 
capita incomes. In Africa today, Teera and Hudson (2004) also observe 
numerous examples of countries with similar levels of per capita income 
but very different levels of tax revenue as a share of GDP, and they find 
that per capita income is insignificant as a determinant of tax revenue as 
a share of GDP after controlling for institutional variables. Stotsky and 
Wolde-Mariam (1997) also argue that differences in tax effort can be 
explained by institutional differences. 
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INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS  
AND NATIVE AUTHORITY REVENUE
The history of indirect rule above showed that African chiefs’ levels 
of authority and autonomy varied under colonial rule. This section 
considers the implications of this variation for the Native Authorities’ 
ability to collect tax revenue. Previous work on colonial governance 
has speculated about the impact of this variation on later development 
outcomes. Findings have been mixed. Lange (2004), for example, finds 
a negative relationship between the degree of indirect rule (measured by 
the share of legal cases decided in Native Courts) and measures of post-
independence political development. However, other work that focuses 
on local institutions or the services they provide often finds the opposite. 
For example, in her work on India, Iyer (2010) finds greater availability 
of public sector goods, such as schools, health centers, and roads, in indi-
rectly ruled areas. The degree of indirect rule is often used, albeit anec-
dotally, to explain why pre-colonial state centralization—measured by 
the Murdock (1967) jurisdictional hierarchy variable—is associated with 
better development outcomes. Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) argue that 
greater local accountability of chiefs as a result of more centralized pre-
colonial states explains the greater provision of public goods in countries 
with a larger share of population from ethnic groups that traditionally had 
more centralized state institutions. 
In literature that is not specific to Africa or indirect rule, we find that 
theories of fiscal decentralization also predict a positive relationship 
between local autonomy and per capita revenue. This work often draws a 
distinction between the devolution of power and delegation of administra-
tive functions (Bardhan 2002, p. 186). Poschl and Weingast (2015) argue 
that local governments, which rely primarily on their own revenue rather 
than transfers from the central government, tend to be more responsive in 
the provision of public goods. This logic is similar to that of the colonial 
decentralization policies discussed earlier.
To measure the autonomy of Native Authorities within the colonial 
state, this paper proposes a reinterpretation of data commonly used to 
measure the structure of pre-colonial institutions. These data come from 
George P. Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas (1967). The Atlas was based 
on a survey of early anthropological research from the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries on societies from around the world, including 
a large number in Africa. It codes a wide range of variables on issues 
such as agriculture, marriage practices, and religion. In recent research, 
the most widely used variable from the Murdock data is “jurisdictional 
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hierarchy,” or “the number of jurisdictional levels in each society” 
(Murdock 1967, p. 160). Using this as an indicator of pre-colonial state 
centralization is controversial, as observation of the societies included in 
the Murdock Atlas started in 1830 at the earliest, with the 1920s being 
the most common decade of observation (Henderson and Whatley 2014). 
We, instead, interpret the Murdock data as reflecting early European 
perceptions of African states, which then informed colonial policies. On 
the basis of these perceptions, additional powers were devolved to Native 
Authorities in African states that were deemed to be more centralized, or 
hierarchical. In regions with African states that appeared less centralized, 
Native Authorities more often acted as delegates of the colonial state. 
Evidence to support this argument is not just anecdotal. The colo-
nial government in Nigeria, for example, classified Native Authorities 
as “organized” and “unorganized.” The former were allowed to retain a 
larger share of the direct tax revenue they collected on behalf of the colo-
nial state and given greater authority over some government functions. 
In particular, they had greater discretionary powers over the allocation of 
expenditure, including salaries and capital spending.13 This classification 
correlates well with the Murdock scores, suggesting that those groups 
perceived by early European observers to be more centralized were also 
more likely to be classified as organized by colonial governments. Table 
5 shows the average jurisdictional hierarchy scores from the Murdock 
Atlas for organized and unorganized Native Authorities in both northern 
and southern Nigeria. 
Table 6 shows the results of an OLS regression in which we add the 
Murdock jurisdictional hierarchy variable to the model developed in 
the previous section. We measured the degree of political centralization 
for each Native Authority by pairing the colonial maps of the Native 
Authorities with a map of the geographical location of indigenous soci-
eties, originally created by Murdock (1959) and digitized by Nunn (2008), 
13 “Native Treasuries Estimates,” 1936–1937, in CO 657/43. 
taBle 5
MURDOCK JURISDICTIONAL HIERARCHY SCORES FOR NIGERIA NATIVE 
AUTHORITIES
Northern Nigeria Southern Nigeria
Organized NA 2.25 3.6
Unorganized NA 1.85  1.96
Source: “Native Treasuries Estimates,” 1936–7, in CO 657/43. Lower scores for northern Nigeria 
reflect the practice of giving centralized emirates control over less centralized societies in the 
area. For example, see Paden (1970, p. 172). 
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and assigning societies to Native Authorities based on this comparison. 
We cross-checked these assignments using information from the Hailey 
surveys on the ethnic composition of the populations of Native Authority 
jurisdictions. We then calculated a weighted average of the political 
centralization score in which the weights were determined by the share of 
the area inhabited by different societies. As expected, this variable has a 
positive and significant relationship with revenue per capita. The scale of 
the coefficient is a bit lower than that of the cash crop and railway variables 
above but still substantial (6.79 as compared to mean revenue per capita 
of 39 pence), and the coefficients of the other variables remain significant. 
It may be that the jurisdictional hierarchy score is proxying for some-
thing else. To check for robustness, we substituted for the Murdock score 
several other measures of the autonomy of the Native Authorities coded 
from the Hailey surveys, shown in columns 2–4. Owing to variations in 
the specificity of the survey responses, these are coded mostly as dummy 
variables reflecting various aspects of the division of authority between 
the Native Authority and the colonial government. We added these to 
taBle 6
AUTONOMY AND REVENUE PER CAPITA
 Revenue  
per Capita
Revenue  
per Capita
Revenue  
per Capita
Revenue  
per Capita
Cash crop dummy 8.474** 14.03*** 11.34*** 11.07***
(2.48) (4.15) (3.21) (3.31)
Distance to large city –0.0383*** –0.0344*** –0.0314** –0.0271**
(–3.09) (–2.83) (–2.48) (–2.10)
Railway stations per 9.77** 10.25** 11.85** 10.70**
 1,000 population (2.22) (2.35) (2.55) (2.46)
NA jurisdictional hierarchy 6.788***
 (Murdock) (3.16)
Traditional selection NA 12.45***
(3.89)
NA sets budget 17.38***
(3.20)
Presence appeal court 8.873**
(2.39)
Constant 13.98** 24.01*** 15.61*** 21.29***
(2.31) (5.30) (2.88) (4.22)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 189 189 189 189
R2 0.382 0.382 0.359 0.380
t-statistics adjusted for heteroscedasticity in parentheses. Significance levels: *p < 0.10, **p < 
0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Sources: Hailey surveys, U.K. National Archives CO 1018. 
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the model one at a time as they are often correlated with one another. 
The first indicates whether the chief’s appointment was by traditional 
selection, rather than by appointment by the colonial state. The relation-
ship between revenue per capita and traditional selection is positive and 
significant, and of a scale similar to the effect of producing cash crops or 
having an additional railway station. 
Another such variable is a dummy for whether the Native Authority 
sets its own budget estimates, as opposed to this being done entirely or 
partly by the district officer. This variable has a large and significant posi-
tive relationship with revenue per capita, with a coefficient of 17.38, close 
to double the size of the coefficients of the economic variables previously 
discussed. Finally, the model considers whether the Native Courts in that 
jurisdiction had appellate powers. This also has a positive and significant 
coefficient, of 8.87. 
This section shows that, even controlling for differences in economic 
structure and market access, the degree of autonomy possessed by Native 
Authorities is associated with higher levels of revenue per capita. Those 
that were perceived as more centralized, able to select their own chiefs 
and set their own estimates, were able to collect more in tax revenue than 
those without such powers. These variables are clearly endogenous and 
the causality could run in both directions. Qualitative evidence on Native 
Authority autonomy presented above shows that colonial administrations 
took into account the resources available to Native Authorities before 
devolving responsibility for providing services, and as a result, those 
better able to raise resources may have had more autonomy. At the same 
time, as noted above, wider studies of decentralization support the link 
between the power of a local government to determine its own expendi-
tures and its ability to collect taxes.
STRUCTURE OF NATIVE AUTHORITIES  
AND NATIVE AUTHORITY REVENUE
There is a substantial historical literature on the relationship between 
political institutions and tax payments, which focuses particularly on 
the willingness of taxpayers to pay. While our data do not include direct 
information on tax compliance per se, they can show that internal struc-
tural differences still help explain differences in revenue per capita, even 
controlling for economic inequalities and intergovernmental relations. 
Much of the literature on political institutions and tax revenue, whether 
using historical or contemporary evidence, stresses a link between political 
voice and tax payments. However, debates persist about the influence of 
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particular political structures. It has frequently been argued, for example, 
that representative regimes have greater fiscal capacity (Feld and Frey 2002; 
Dincecco 2015). However, not all studies find a direct link between type 
of government and fiscal capacity, and political voice may be expressed 
in a variety of regime types (Johnson 2006; Karaman and Pamuk 2010; 
Timmons 2010; Rosenthal and Wong 2011; Johnson and Koyama 2017). 
The Hailey surveys allow for several indicators of institutional struc-
ture to be added to the model constructed above. Table 7 presents these 
results. One indicator is whether the Native Authority is comprised of a 
chief in council rather than a solo chief or council only. As noted earlier, 
councils were introduced to Native Authorities particularly to allow 
for the voices of groups such as migrants or mission-educated Africans 
who were not necessarily part of traditional hierarchies. This variable 
taBle 7
NATIVE AUTHORITY STRUCTURE
 Revenue  
per Capita
Revenue  
per Capita
Revenue  
per Capita
Revenue  
per Capita
Cash crop dummy 9.996*** 11.30*** 10.21*** 9.010***
(2.93) (3.44) (2.90) (2.62)
Distance to large city –0.0406*** –0.0443*** –0.0426*** –0.0358***
(–3.35) (–3.55) (–3.36) (–2.77)
Railway stations per 9.11** 10.04** 9.44** 9.75**
 1,000 population (2.05) (2.36) (2.16) (2.32)
NA jurisdictional hierarchy 6.069*** 6.032*** 5.989*** 6.868***
 (Murdock) (2.71) (2.87) (2.78) (3.14)
Chief in council 13.20***
(3.47)
Solo chief 11.20***
(3.15)
Elected NA –11.90***
(–3.53)
Number of chiefs per NA –0.428***
(–2.81)
Removal by the people 5.756
(0.96)
Constant 24.86*** 17.16*** 22.23*** 13.09**
 (2.89) (2.89) (3.11) (2.07)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 189 189 189 189
R2 0.410 0.403 0.391 0.386
t-statistics adjusted for heteroscedasticity in parentheses. Significance levels: *p < 0.10, **p < 
0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Sources: Hailey surveys, U.K. National Archives CO 1018. 
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is positive and significant, with a coefficient of 13.2, or just over a third 
of the standard deviation in revenue per capita. A dummy variable for 
whether a Native Authority was comprised of a solo chief is also positive 
and significant, relative to the reference category of Native Authorities 
comprised only of a council. Modern studies of traditional leadership 
in African countries have found that the presence of chiefs plays an 
important coordinating role in development projects (Baldwin 2016). 
The apparent importance of having both a chief and council in terms of 
raising revenue suggests something similar may have been true of Native 
Authorities. The apparent importance leadership may offer some expla-
nation for why Native Authorities with chiefs (with or without councils) 
were able to collect more revenue per capita than those led by a council 
only. This may also help explain the negative sign on the coefficient for 
elected Native Authorities, which lacked a traditionally selected chief. 
We also find a significant, though small (–0.43), negative coefficient 
for the variable indicating the number of chiefs per Native Treasury. 
Smaller Native Authorities were often required to federate for financial 
purposes, as mentioned earlier. This relationship suggests that difficul-
ties in coordinating several chiefs may have limited revenue collection to 
some extent, or at the very least that federating did not overcome existing 
structural disadvantages for these areas. 
The accountability of chiefs also appears to have been important. A 
dummy indicating whether chiefs can be removed from their position 
also has a positive coefficient, though not significant. In her study of 
indirect rule in India, Iyer (2010) argues similarly that the fact that rulers 
could be removed “in cases of ‘misrule’” appears to play quite an impor-
tant role. This finding also fits Mamdani’s (1996) characterizations of 
African institutions under indirect rule as “decentralized despotism.” The 
inability of a chief to become a despot seems to have been associated 
with higher revenues. 
Again, it is important to note that the channels of causality may run in 
both directions. Studies of local government taxation in other contexts 
suggest that the payment of taxes may incentivize greater vigilance on the 
part of taxpayers and greater efforts to be involved in decision making. 
Poschl and Weingast (2015, p. 166) note that, if citizens are made to pay 
taxes, they are “more inclined to watch over or scrutinize the govern-
ment’s activities and to demand representation in government and influ-
ence policy discussions.” With cross-sectional data, it is not possible to 
say, for example, whether the presence of councils drove an increase in 
tax revenue or whether the response of taxpayers to an increase in tax 
demands was behind the creation of a council. 
How Africans Shaped British Colonial Institutions 27
One counter-argument might be, particularly given the limited data 
on per capita incomes, that our results simply reflect the wider implica-
tions of higher levels of state centralization, as measured by Murdock. A 
number of the sources we have cited previously argue that local inequali-
ties in Africa are largely the result of the persistent legacies of historical 
characteristics, whether through wealth (Bandyopadhyay and Green 
2016) or through some function of centralized pre-colonial institutions 
(Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013, 2014). To address this point, 
Table 8 presents the same analysis for only those Native Authorities 
without centralized state structures.14 Substituting for the Murdock 
taBle 8
RESULTS FOR SUBSAMPLE OF DECENTRALIZED NATIVE AUTHORITIES
 Revenue  
per Capita
Revenue  
per Capita
Revenue  
per Capita
Revenue  
per Capita
Cash crop dummy 8.415*** 11.04*** 8.994*** 6.929**
(2.67) (3.79) (2.73) (2.16)
Distance to large city –0.0220 –0.0325** –0.0219 –0.0168
(–1.37) (–2.00) (–1.31) (–1.03)
Railway stations per 5.890 7.832 6.290 6.696
 1,000 population (0.92) (1.65) (0.99) (1.06)
NA sets budget 22.88*** 23.84*** 23.88*** 24.35***
(2.74) (3.02) (2.96) (3.10)
Chief in council 6.933*
(1.91)
Solo chief 9.488***
(2.84)
Elected NA –14.21***
(-3.66)
Number of chiefs per NA –0.337**
(-2.12)
Removal by the people –2.217
(–0.33)
Constant 15.43*** 24.41*** 26.69*** 21.16***
 (2.83) (5.08) (4.49) (4.09)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 124 124 124 124
R2 0.339 0.368 0.330 0.318
t-statistics adjusted for heteroscedasticity in parentheses. Significance levels: *p < 0.10, **p < 
0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Sources: Hailey surveys, U.K. National Archives CO 1018. 
14 We include only those Native Authorities with a score of three or less on the Murdock 
jurisdictional hierarchy measure.
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measure of autonomy, which unsurprisingly is not significant in this 
subsample, is the dummy for whether the Native Authority sets its own 
estimates, as discussed in the previous section on intergovernmental rela-
tions. This proxy for the autonomy of the Native Authority remains posi-
tive, significant, and large throughout the analysis. 
The results remain quite stable, with coefficients similar in size to 
those in the full model presented in previous sections, though some of the 
variables lose significance in this subsample.15 Importantly, the variables 
that capture both autonomy and political voice and accountability of the 
Native Authorities all remain similar to the full model, except whether or 
not the people can de-stool the chief, which becomes smaller and changes 
signs but remains insignificant. 
The indicators of political voice and accountability of Native Authorities 
point to mechanisms at work in the subsample that are similar to those in 
the full model presented above. Most importantly, the dummy indicating 
the presence of a chief-in-council structure remains positively associated 
with revenue per capita, while the number of chiefs per treasury remains 
negatively associated. For the Native Authorities in states perceived by 
early European officials to be less centralized, both the autonomy and 
the political voice and accountability that developed during the colonial 
period played a significant role in the development of fiscal capacity. 
This suggests that the story is not driven merely by the underlying afflu-
ence or capacity of African states that were centralized early on. 
CONCLUSION
The literature on colonial institutions and their legacies takes two 
approaches to explaining the relative importance of Africans and 
Europeans in shaping them. The first emphasizes European decision-
making, ignoring the influence of pre-colonial institutions. The second, 
swinging too far in the other direction, minimizes the impact of the 
European institutions and argues that pre-colonial institutions remained 
more influential. In this paper, we argue that both approaches miss a 
foundational feature of colonial rule: the dynamic interaction between 
African elites and the colonial state. 
Using new data on tax revenues collected by Native Authorities in four 
British colonies in Africa from c. 1948, the paper shows that differences 
in fiscal capacity between local governments were linked to a range of 
economic, social, and political factors: market access, the relationship 
between Native Authorities and the colonial state, and the structure of 
15 For full results for the subsample of decentralized societies, see Online Appendix 3.
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the Native Authorities themselves. Even those Native Authorities that 
colonial officials before 1914 perceived as less organized could influ-
ence revenue collection through their chiefs’ and councils’ decisions. 
A message we want to convey strongly in this paper is that one-sided 
data—either on European policy or on African states—will not suffice to 
explain the structure and legacies of colonial institutions. We now need a 
more systematic study of how these two interacted as both European offi-
cials and African elites responded to the political, economic, and social 
changes of the twentieth century. 
The four colonies considered here, Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Nyasaland, 
and Kenya, were all British, which may raise questions about how far our 
argument can be generalized to other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. Other 
colonial powers were probably no less dependent on African intermedi-
aries than the British, and their interactions with African elites may also 
have produced institutions that helped to shape the experience and legacy 
of colonialism.16 
The collection of local data represents one of the new frontiers of African 
economic history. Future data collection efforts are bound to yield more 
systematic information, giving us a more comprehensive understanding of 
the institutions that governed African populations under colonial rule. Such 
study should not be restricted to tax revenue. Writing more generally about 
the economic history of state institutions, Hoffman (2015, p. 327) notes 
that courts, government spending, and other services “cry out for study,” 
along with taxation. The extent to which Native Authorities helped shape 
the “uneven institutional topography” of local African political organiza-
tion today (Boone 2003, pp. 37–38) remains largely unknown. Economic 
historians have a long way to go in understanding the role Africans played 
and how they shaped the development of the continent. 
Historian David Killingray (Institute of Commonwealth Studies 2013) 
once joked that the ideal exam question for a course on African colo-
nialism might be: “During colonial rule, Africa was mainly governed by 
Africans. Discuss.” Our paper takes a first step toward investigating the 
truth of that statement.
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